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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this study, February 2001 crisis in Turkey is analyzed as the severest crises that 
Turkey had been suffered. In this context, the financial crises types and models are 
considered, then the factors of the 2001 crisis are derived. The new program after the crisis 
is also examined. 
 The conspicuous factors of the February 2001 crisis are globalization, financial 
liberalization, banking sector fragility, debt stock and November 2000 crisis in Turkey. In 
this study, Turkey 2001 crisis causes and consequences are breed, from the general issues 
about financial crises. As a remedy of the crisis the new program “Transition Program for 
Strengthening the Turkish Economy” is also taken into consideration. This dissertation 
brings up the importance of good governance and, transparency; legal system arrangement; 
healthy and soundness banking sector; trust to government; and the application of 
reformatory politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
 Bu çalışmada Türkiye'nin yaşadığı en zorlu finansal kriz olan Şubat 2001 krizi 
incelenmektedir. Bu bağlamda; finansal kriz çeşitlerinden ve modellerinden yola çıkarak 
Şubat 2001 krizine neden olan faktörler çıkarılmıştır. Yaşanan finansal kriz sonucu ortaya 
konan yeni program da ele alınmıştır.  
 Şubat 2001 krizine neden olan küreselleşme, finansal liberasyon, bankacılık sektörü 
kırılganlığı, borç yükü, ve Türkiye Kasım 2000 krizi faktörleri öne çıkmaktadır. Bu 
çalışmada Türkiye 2001 krizinin neden ve sonuçları, finansal krizlerin genel 
çıkarımlarından yola çıkarak edinilmiştir. “Güçlü Ekonomiye Geçiş Programı” kriz 
tedavisi için uygulamaya konulan yeni ekonomik program olarak incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma 
ile; iyi yönetim ve şeffaflığın, yasal sistem düzenlemelerinin, sağlıklı  ve sağlam bankacılık 
sektörünün, hükumete karşı güvenin, ve düzeltici politika uygulamalarının önemi ortaya 
konulmuştur. 
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 Introduction: 
  
 
 
 
 Turkey has been hit by several financial crises since 1990. The first severe crisis, 
namely 1994 crisis, occurred at the beginning of the year 1994.  There was a managed float 
regime in economy at that period.  The second one occurred at the end of 2000. The 
economic program which came into play at the end of 1999 was exchange rate based 
stabilization program. It is possible to say that, initially, the program was applied 
successfully given the decline in the interest rates, and in price acceleration. In addition to 
these improvements, the inflation rate had declined to its smallest value since 1986. 
Unfortunately, the adverse events in the domestic and foreign markets led to December 
2000 and February 2001 Crises. These crises were the precursors to the end of economic 
program that IMF supported.  
  The main purpose of this study is to explain the February 2001 crisis in Turkey in 
conjunction with the reasons that lay the foundation for such a crisis. The researcher will 
also touch upon the consequences of this crisis. First, the definition of a financial crisis is 
given, and the relevant terms are explained. In general terms, financial crisis is defined as  
the sudden and apparent breakdown in the financial indicators, which leads to a sharp 
transition into economic stagnation and brings trouble in a country's economy. Secondly,  
various kinds of financial crises are perused in order to accentuate the 2001 crisis of 
Turkey. In this regard, currency crisis, banking crisis, foreign debt crisis, and systemic 
financial crisis are analyzed. Currency crisis stands out as the most frequent type of crisis  
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in the world, and this pattern is also dominant in Turkish economy. Thirdly, to give the 
vital affects of currency crises in Turkish economy, this paper will look into the models 
that have been used to deduce currency crises. In the fourth part of this paper, the factors 
that engender the financial crisis are investigated. In this part; public debt, international 
capital movements, inflation, exchange rate policy, and financial liberalization hold place. 
Particularly, the case of Turkey is examined in the financial liberalization section starting 
with historical background, and understanding the essence of international capital 
movements. The reasons of 2001 crisis are discussed in the fifth part. Within the analysis in 
the fifth part; Asia and Russia crises, banking sector, debt stock and political instability, 
and November 2000 crisis are examined. It appears that, banking sector fragility with high 
open positions, make sector more vulnerable to the crisis. On the other hand, debt stock 
strikes us as another important treat to the economy. Simply; such issues as current account 
deficit and erroneous policies come across as the primary players that lay the groundwork 
for the crisis. With regard to overcome the consequences of the crisis, the new economic 
program “Transition Program for Strengthening the Turkish Economy” is executed in May 
2001.  
 To sum; in first four parts of this paper the general issues about financial crisis are 
analyzed, and in continuous parts, the causes of February 2001 crisis and the “Transition 
Program for Strengthening the Turkish Economy” are examined. In the first part, the 
definitions of financial crisis and related terms; in the second part the kinds of financial 
crisis as currency crisis, banking crisis, foreign debt crisis, and systemic financial crises; in 
the third part, models of currency crisis as first generation models, second generation 
models and additional models; and in the fourth part the factors of financial crisis derived 
from models of financial crisis are stated.  In the fifth part, financial factors that cause the 
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2001 crisis and additional factors like media-bank factor and government expenditures are 
analyzed. Last but not least, the program for strengthening the Turkish economy is 
overviewed in the sixth part of the paper. 
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 1. Financial Crisis  
 
 The word “crisis” derives its etymological origin from Latin and Greek; in Social 
Sciences it refers to emergency and depression, and it is used in the face of an unexpected 
social, economical or psychological event, a downturn of one's affairs, and inadequate 
resolutions for this complication. In economics, crisis is an old term in business cycle 
theory, referring to a sharp transition to economic stagnation. 
 Furthermore, “economic crisis” speaks to the events that are emergent and 
unforeseen in economics, that affect the national economy at a macro level while affecting 
the firms at  micro level by bringing crucial effects(Aktan, Şen, 2002)1. Economic crisis is 
a long-term economic situation characterized by unemployment, low prices, and low levels 
of trade and investment. 
 However, according to another definition economic crisis is generally represented 
by critical fluctuations for any goods and services, factor of productions or unacceptable 
changes in price and/or quantity in financial markets. (Kibritçioğlu, 2001)2. 
  According to Mishkin's (1996)3 asymmetric knowledge theory, a financial crisis is a 
non-linear breakdowns in financial markets, if inverse selection and moral hazard issues 
move pro-dimensions, then languishing the bonds channelize to economic units occurs.  
 Besides, financial crisis is defined as an irresolute or critical time or a state of 
affairs where a decisive change is impending, one with the distinct possibility with highly 
                                                 
1  See for details: Aktan,C.Can; Huseyin, Şen 'Ekonomik kriz: Nedenler ve Çözüm Önerileri' (2002). 
2  See for details: Kibritçioğlu, Aykut 'Türkiye'de Ekonomik Krizler ve Hükümetler, 1969- 
    2001' (2001).  
3  See for details: Mishkin, Frederick 'Lessons From the Asian Crisis' (1996). 
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unenviable outcome. Moreover, a financial crisis, is an issue when money demand rapidly 
rises relative to money supply (wikipedia.org). 
 Paul Krugman believes in the nonexistence of the definition of crisis whereas, 
Edward and Santanella evaluate the crisis in light of  the decline in the value of money. 
Also, other researchers integrate the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves into this 
definition (Edwards, 2001)4. 
 Kindleberger (1978)5 emphasizes the role of cross expectations, forced liquidations 
and debt deflation. Capitalist system that could not fulfill a lender of a last resort function 
has to face to financial crises and instability. “Mania, panic, and crash” are the three stages 
for defined process. At “mania” period, the investors take on debt and pay for financial 
assets. At “panic” it turns into inverse situation as, investors try to make payments on loan 
and try to convert assets into cash with bank runs and sudden decline of the securities 
market. Furthermore, in “crash” period, by the collapse of prices all taken assets in 
“mania” terminates the process. Financial crisis is related to the peak points of the business 
cycle. Kindleberg suggests financial crisis as the main issue of the transformation of 
economic expansion at the peak of business cycle to a reduction. Also states as an 
unavoidable result of prior events.  
 According to Raymond Goldsmith financial crises are the sudden and apparent 
breakdowns in financial indicators such as the failure in short-term interest rates, price of 
assets, disequilibrium of balance of payments. That is financial crisis appears suddenly and 
apparently and also brings trouble in country's economy.  
 Michael Bordo, lists the main issues and connections in financial crisis. 
• The fear of trouble in payments: Trouble in payments can be caused by poor 
                                                 
4  See for details: Edwards, Sebastian 'Does the Current Account Matter?' (2001). 
5  See for details: Kindleberger, Charles P. 'Manias, Panics, and Crashes' (1978). 
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management, prevision disability, fragility debt structure, inadequacy in liquidity. 
• Liquidity crisis: rolling assets into cash could rise the  interest rates and decline the 
price of assets. 
• The threats after essential discharge of assets: since the decline occurring in the 
value of portfolio in financial institutions. 
 Some other capitalist theories about financial crisis include (wikipedia.org): 
•  The decline in the rate of profit: The degree of capital intensity of production to 
rise is involved the accumulation of capital. A fall in the rate of profit occurs if all 
things are constant, and  maybe it leads a crisis. 
• Underconsumption:  If pushing wages down and labor effort up with raising the 
surplus value leads inadequate consumer demand and by the way inadequate 
aggregate demand. 
•  Profit squeeze of full employment: If the wages rise too high then it damages the 
rate of profit which leads a recession.  
 
 There exist some related concepts with financial crisis as 'depression', 'recession' 
and 'slump'. 
 1.1. Depression: It is a period of time of financial crisis in commerce, finance, and 
industry. When the economy is in depression, it is understood from falling prices, credit 
restrictions, decline in output and investment, rise in unemployment and numerous 
bankruptcies. If overproduction, and decreased demand squeeze the production, dismissal 
of employees and wage cuts happen, a depression occurs. High level of unemployment and 
fallen wages lead the decrease in purchasing power that causes the crisis to spread.  
  
 7 
 
 1.2. Recession: It is a less severe crisis. It is generally thought to be a normal part 
of business cycles. Disequilibrium between the quantity of produced goods and the 
purchasing power of customers causes recessions. If a recession keeps in economy for a 
long time period, it can turn into a depression. During recession, to reduce the severity of 
economic downturns, the measures such that large scale public works expenditure, tax cuts, 
interest rate adjustments, and deficit spending should take the attention. Cause of 
international trade and deficit, depressions, and recessions tend to become one of  
worldwide problems. 
 1.3. Slump: When the economy is in depression, it is a time period in the business 
cycle. In slump period, unemployment is very high, and national income is lower. For 
instance, the UK experienced a slump in 1930's, in 1980, and in 1990-92. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The kinds of financial crisis 
 
 
 
 In general approach, the kinds of financial crisis is classified as principally: 
'currency crisis', 'banking crisis', 'foreign debt crisis' and 'systemic financial crises'. These 
kinds of crises mostly follow each other; that's why; it is too difficult to differentiate one 
the other.  
 
 2.1. Currency crisis: 
 
  
 Currency crisis happens when the value of a currency changes quickly, 
undermining its ability to serve as a medium exchange rate or a store of a value. Currency 
crisis can be very destructive to small open economies or bigger but unstable ones. 
Governments often take on the role of fending off such speculative attacks by satisfying 
the excessive demand for a given currency using the country's own currency reserves or its 
foreign reserves. 
 Especially in fixed exchange rate systems, switching market demands suddenly 
from local currency to foreign currency  leads an exhaustion in the currency reserves of 
Central Bank which causes crises. If a speculative attack on a country's local money  
results in devaluation or currency leakage, currency or money crises emerges . When 
Central Bank has to dispose huge amounts of money reserves or raise the interest rate in 
order to maintain the market, currency or money crises becomes inevitable. 
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 The speculative attacks that lead to currency crisis, may be followed by the collapse 
of the domestic capital market like that of Asian Crisis in  1997. It might also raise the 
foreign debt in the short-term or create the exaggerated raise in the exchange rate like the 
incidence in the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95,Last but not least, it might  trigger a 
political choice to leave the fixed exchange rate regimes as in England in 1992 (Milesi-
Ferretti, Razin, 1998)6.  
 Currency crisis can be categorized into two groups: balance of payments crisis and 
exchange rate crisis. In the countries where fixed exchange rate regime is applied,  money 
crisis is labeled as the balanced of payments so as to  accentuate  the decline in currency 
reserves. However, It is called currency crisis in the countries where flexible exchange rate 
regime is administered, Therefore, the attention is taken from declining reserves to the 
change in rates (Kibritçioğlu, 2001)7. 
 After 1990s, the systemic component of the currency crises that occurred in the 
developing countries was the capital account crises which stemmed from high capital 
movement .  The most important two components of capital account crisis are large scale 
capital inflow and the short term loans that are abundant in this capital inflow.  
 International capital movements enable the output to raise. In case of leaving fixed 
rate regimes, the disguised warranties given by  foreign creditors elicit the foreign capital 
inflow to banking system until a crisis happens.  Over the course of the time the domestic 
financial sector becomes fragile. Before the crisis, the rate of capital in flow to gross 
domestic product (GDP) increases. Until the banking system is in insolvency, banks get 
                                                 
6  See for details: Milesi-Ferretti; Maria, G. and Razin, Asaf 'Current Account Reversals and 
Currency             Crises: Empirical Regularities' (1998). 
7  See for details: Kibritçioğlu, Aykut 'Türkiye'de Ekonomik Krizler ve Hükümetler, 1969- 
    2001' (2001).  
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more debtors through the foreign debt, the capital inflow suddenly falls and in the mean 
time, the output declines. The growth after the crisis is dependent on the new 
encouragements for new foreign capital inflow (Dekle, Kletzer, 2001)8. 
 
 
      2.2. Banking crisis 
 
 Banking crisis is  a situation where numerous bank customers try to withdraw their 
bank deposits concurrently and the bank's reserves are not adequate to cover all the 
withdrawals. Series of contingent withdrawals are caused by a sudden decline in  trust or 
fear of bank's insolvency. The failure of a bank doesn’t affect all the banking systems 
necessarily; but in the case of a huge bank rate within a banking sector that is in crises a 
single banking crisis turns into a systemic crisis which affects the overall economy of the 
country. 
 In general, the expansion of banks or sudden withdrawals  imply a highly needed  
liquidity which leads to bankruptcy. According to IMF (2002), banking crises last longer 
than money crises, and banking crises reflect on economic activity outrageously. 
According to Yay (2001)9, the financial crises were not common in 1950s and 1960s when  
there were controls on capital bargain and the financial restrictions. the research that was 
conducted from 1970s to 1990s  report that money crises were dominant from 1970 to 
1985, whereas banking crises started to increase after the  mid1980s.  
 
                                                 
8  See for details: Dekle, Robert; Kletzer, Kenneth 'Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises: 
Theory and Empirical  Evidence From East Asia' (2001). 
9  See for details: Yay, G.Gülsün '1990’lı Yıllardaki Finansal Krizler ve Türkiye Krizi' (2001) 
 11 
 
 2.3. Foreign Debt Crises 
 
 Foreign debt crisis is a situation which refers to a country's inability to refunding 
the foreign debts. It particularly appears as debt rescheduling and delayed obligations 
where government shows inability to refund and difficulty to find new foreign loan. 
 The crisis occurs when the debt raiser can’t pay the loans back or once the lenders 
realize the possibility of a default in paying and  thereby, not giving new loans. This kind 
of crisis may be caused by both public and private debts. The sense the risk of inability to 
refunding of public sector may bring about  a rapid decline of foreign capital inflow and a 
money crisis (IMF, 2002). 
 
 2.4. Systemic Financial Crises 
 The systemic financial crisis expresses a crucial degeneration in financial markets. 
It depends on the structure and variability of the economic, social, and political 
movements. The lender of last resort ability of Central Bank can be limited by a pegged 
exchange rate policy. It turns out payment balance problem to a banking sector problem 
(Fernandez, Schumacher, 1997)10. In a notable level of pegged-policy causes the rise in 
commercial deficit. Moreover, the commercial deficit inevitably causes a speculative attack 
on currency  and decline in exchange rate to harmonize the situation (Feldstein, 1999)11. 
An interaction between the corporate profile of debt market and devaluation of local 
currency erupts, when a speculative attack starts. All these pull the country in a systematic 
financial crisis (Mishkin, 2001)12.  
                                                 
10 See for details: Fernandez, R., and Schumacher, L. “'Does Argentina Provide a Case for Narrow 
 Banking?' in Preventing Banking Sector Distress and Crises in Latin America” (1997) 
11 See for details: Feldstein, M. 'Self-Protection for Emerging Market Economies' (1999) 
12 See for details: Miskin, F. 'Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises 
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 3. Models of Currency Crises  
  
 This section is an overview of the theoretical literature on the causes of currency 
crises, as a crucial pattern of financial crises in general. The importanceof identification of 
the early warning indicators is taken into consideration. The theoretical literature is 
frequently classified in terms of three kinds generations models in the light of Eichengreen, 
Rose and Wyplosz (1994)13.  
 
 3.1 First Generation Models 
 Krugman (1979)14, Flood and Garber (1984)15 put emphasis on continuous 
breakdown of macroeconomic fundamentals which exhaust  international reserves of 
central banks as the main cause of currency decays which is caused by inconsistent 
economic policies. The First Generation Models are described as speculative attacks 
because of rational arbitrage. The deterioration generally occurs due to  reliance on 
seigniorage revenues to finance public sector deficits. Being aware of these gradual 
exhaustion of international reserves, rational economic agents  expect that prevailing 
exchange rate regime will not last. This  triggers a sudden speculative attack on the 
currency, which prevents excessive capital loss. Based on the experiences in 1970's and 
                                                                                                                                                    
 in Emerging Market Countries' (2001). 
13 See for details: Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose and Charles Wyplosz 1994. "Speculative Attacks on  
Pegged Exchange Rates: An Empirical Exploration with Special Reference to the 
       European Monetary System,"  
14 See for details: Krugman, Paul 'A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises' (1979). 
15 See for details: Flood, Robert P. ; Garber Peter M. 'Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Some Linear 
Examples' (1984). 
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1980's in Latin America economies, Krugman, Flood and Garber call for an economy that 
is required to finance government budget deficit by monetization. If the country has each 
fixed exchange rate regime with monetization, which causes a reduction in the Central 
Bank international reserves. The speculative attack on currency is inevitable if the reserves 
are limited. The model also asserts that the budget deficits and raise in domestic credit are 
the indicators for speculative attacks. It is more likely to notice these indicators on the 
condition that expansionary monetary or fiscal policy generates a rise in current account 
deficit by a raise in import demand,. A rise in the price of non-tradables may trigger off 
overvalue of real exchange rate which also makes indicators more noticable  . 
Consequently, some variables such as current account deficits, the real exchange rate, the 
amount of reserves might imply that the country is prone to speculative attacks (Özatay, 
Sak, 2002)16.  
 This models highlight that fiscal deficits ground on large scale monetary floating 
and this causes a reduction of reserves and bring about reduction of money. Moreover,  
declining pattern of macroeconomic parameters is the main reason for crises.  
 As a first step to understand currency crises, Krugman's model is so important that 
an epitomized non-sustainable fixed exchange rate regime should be abandoned.  First-
generation models explain that continual fiscal deficits, rise in debt levels or decline in 
reserves precede the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. In the First Generation 
Models the government inquires an extrinsic rule to decide when to abandon the fixed  
exchange rate regime (Mariano, Shabbir, Gültekin, 2001)17. 
 In the first generation model leading indicators can be stated as: gradual decline in 
                                                 
16  See for details: Özatay, Fatih; Sak, Güven 'The 2000-2001 financial crisis in Turkey' (2002). 
17 See for details: Mariano, Robert; Shabbir, Tayyeb; Gültekin,N. Bülent 'Financial Crisis in South East 
Asia' (2001). 
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reserves and gradual in the interest rate differential18. 
 
 3.2 Second Generation Models 
 
 The Second Generation Models emphasize the macroeconomic policy issues. It 
emerged after 1992-92 European Money System (EMS) crisis since such countries as the 
UK and Spain suffered crisis that the phenomenon which cause the currency crisis is the 
sudden changes in the expectations of sustainability of macroeconomic policies. The 
second-generation models that Obstfeld (1994)19, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz(1997)20 
advanced are defined as explaining self-fulfilling contagious currency crises. According to 
Obstfeld the Second Generation Models require three elements. The researchers list these 
elements as the reason why the government try to abandon its fixed exchange rate , the 
reason why the government try to defend the exchange rate ., and  the cost of defending a 
fixed exchange rate.  
 On the other hand, government's comparison of the net benefits from changing the 
exchange-rate versus defending it, is the main issue. Benefits and costs depend on 
economic fundamentals. For instance, in a strong economic structure, the cost of defending 
fixed exchange rate regime is much lower for the government which is concerned with its 
benefits and the government with high possibility which commits to fixed exchange rate 
regardless of expectations of speculative attacks.  However, in a weak economic structure, 
the cost of fixed exchange rate is very high for the government and generally the 
government has strong incentive not to defend the peg (Mariano, Shabbir, Gültekin, 
                                                 
18  See for details: Özatay, Fatih; Sak, Güven 'The 2000-2001 financial crisis in Turkey' (2002). 
19 See for details: Obstfeld, Maurice 'The Logic of Currency Crises' (1994) 
20 See for details: Eichengreen, Barry; Rose, Andrew and Wyplosz, Charles 'Contagious Currency Crisis' 
(1997).  
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2001)21.  
 As to Krugman, “If a speculative attack drives a currency off its peg, this does not 
imply a negative shock to employment and output. Indeed, in this case the contrary should 
be true: because the policy constraint of a peg is removed, the result is actually positive for 
short-run macroeconomics”. Also, Flood and Marion (1998)22 note that second-generation 
type crisis models require that in the post-crisis period there should be expansionary 
policies that validate anticipations of speculators. 
 Furthermore, fixed exchange rate arrangements are viewed as a conditional 
commitment device in the Second Generation Models. The country's policymaker can 
always choose the option of devalueing, revalueing or floating. Therefore, the commitment 
is limited in this model. A currency crisis is a situation in which the policymaker is on the 
edge of choosing this option.  
 As a conclusion, in second generation models the main issue is the costs and 
benefits of the fixed exchange rate policy. One of the most important points is the 
government policy regarding  defending a fixed currency peg versus other targets. The 
government's optimal response is devaluation to the actions of speculators.  Any variable 
that is observable such as public debt, banks, real interest rates may affect government's 
attitude about defending or not defending the fixed peg .  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See for details: Mariano, Robert; Shabbir, Tayyeb; Gültekin,N. Bülent 'Financial Crisis in South East 
Asia' (2001). 
22  See for details: Flood, Robert; Marion, Nancy 'Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crises 
 Literature' (1998). 
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 3.3. Additional Models of Financial Crises: 
 After the Asian crisis, it was needed additional approaches to explain causes of 
crises, especially the nature of their spread.  Additional approaches can be categorized in 
three groups. First one is 'moral hazard' problems of investors; the second one is the 
investors' herd behavior as 'information cascade' models and the last one is the 'contagion' 
effect of the financial crises. 
 
 3.3.1. Moral Hazard Models 
 Official lending causes moral hazard deformations. Allen and Gale (2000)23 
described Moral Hazard Models in their recent work as a formation of ideas that 
were expressed by Krugman (1998)24 , McKinnon and Pill (1997)25. The main issue 
of the model is liquidity shocks. Debtor countries with costly policies are very likely 
to have a crisis. Trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral 
hazard should be paid specific attention. According to research, interaction of bad 
fundamentals  bring about international financial crises through three agents: 
international investors, local government and IMF. High liquidity support  enables 
agents to roll over their debt and reduce the likelihood of a crisis. The main logic 
here is  the advanced debt-financing with liquidity support  which  represses the 
factors of a crisis. As Krugman (1998), Allen and Gale (2000) emphasized, the 
monitoring function of banks does not work well because of  the protection of 
domestic banks by implicit government bailout guarantee, since the moral hazard 
                                                 
23 See for details: Franklin ,Allen; Douglas, Gale 'Optimal Currency Crises' (2000). 
24 See for details: Krugman, Paul 'Bubble, boom, crash: theoretical notes on Asia's crisis' (1998) 
25 See for details: McKinnon, Ronald I.; Pill, Huw 'Credible Economic Liberalizations and Over-Borrowing' 
(1997). 
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problem become a serious matter. Moreover, moral hazard period makes the 
financial system of economy fragile (Mariano, Shabbir, Gültekin, 2001)26.  
  
 
 3.3.2. Information Cascades Models  
 In game theory, information cascade is a situation in which each actor makes 
the same choice regardless of his personal thought. In behavioral economics the 
information cascades has become an important topic since financial markets often 
face to the situation. The situation is simply based on the rational herd behavior 
models. The model is developed by Banerjee (1992)27 ; Bichchandani, Hershleifer 
and Welch (1992)28. They considered how people's expectations is formed and 
affected by the others' or by public information. The investors' expectations are very 
sensitive to new information if individual ‘s personal information is not reflected on 
transactions in markets. Furthermore, this theory shows the importance of 
informational transparency in markets with regard to  protecting economy from 
financial crisis. 
  To sum, information cascades are perceived as the products of rational 
expectations and irrational herd behavior. 
 
                                                 
26 See for details: Mariano, Robert; Shabbir, Tayyeb; Gültekin,N. Bülent 'Financial Crisis in South East 
Asia' (2001). 
27 See for details: Banerjee, Abhijit 'A Simple Model of Herd Behavior' (1992). 
28 See for details: Bichchandani, Sushil; Hirshleifer, David and Welch, Ivo 'A Theory of Fads, Fashion, 
Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades' (1992) 
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 3.3.3. Contagion Model 
 In modern open economy, a country's finance is mostly dependent upon 
international development, Contagion is the idea that if a financial crisis occurs in 
one country, it is very likely to spread to other countries.  
 There is a plethora of studies on contagion. Calvo (1998)29  noted  the role of 
liquidity for the spread of crises The lower prices for converting asserts into cash are 
caused by asymmetric information. Masson (1998)30 explained three scenarios on 
contagion: “monsoonal effect” which is the exogenous shocks that affect all 
countries , “spillover effect” based on the competitiveness of competitors are 
affected by the crisis in one country, and “pure contagion effect” which involves the 
spread of crises that are set off by the market sentiment or herding behavior 
(Mariano, Shabbir, Gültekin, 2001)31.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
29 See for details: Calvo, Guillermo 'Capital Flows and Capital Market Crises: The Simple Economics of 
Sudden Stops' (1998) 
30  See for details: Masson, Paul 'Contagion: Monsoonal Effects, Spillovers and Jumps Between 
multiple Equilibria' (1998). 
31 See for details: Mariano, Robert; Shabbir, Tayyeb; Gültekin,N. Bülent 'Financial Crisis in South East 
Asia' (2001). 
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 4. The Factors that causes financial crises 
 
 By the help of types financial crisis and financial crises models, factors that causes 
financial crises is derived as follows: 
 
 4.1. Public debt 
 
 
 One of the most important causes of financial crisis is the expansionary fiscal 
policies which are based on the public expenditures in developing countries. Governments' 
fiscal burden increased sharply for countries that are highly indebt if the raise in domestic 
interest rates caused by market expectations of depreciation. It could lead to the 
devaluation of domestic currency debt. The excessive public debt raises the ambiguity risk 
for investors . 
 In such indebt countries, they get into debt to pay prior debts  which can be defined 
as vicious circle of debt. At this period, the interest burden become heavier thus the budget 
expenditure can not be faced. The taken debts are not used for efficient investments , thus 
it becomes inevitable to avoid vicious circle of debt. When the time comes to pay for debts, 
it would be added with debt interests, that countries which are in suggested circle only get 
into debt to pay for interest of debts.  
 Debt management is a very important issue, and it can  be also said to be a 
necessity in order to save the country from financial crises. The countries which try to 
expand their technological structure or investments by means of debt,should take the risk 
factors into consideration (Arıcan, 2002)32. 
 Borrowing is an influential policy instrument during crisis periods if debt 
                                                 
32 See for details: Arıcan, Erişah 'Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde İstikrar Politikaları' (2002). 
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management system is effective. Thus, it is a kind of an instrument to fight against crisis. 
Unfortunately, debt mostly triggers the crises rather than preventing them. For instance, 
after the crises in Latin America, South Asia, and Russia, the debt stock increased and they 
partly got in to the circle (Meriç, 2003)33. 
 
  
 4.2. International Capital Movements  
  
 The increasing number of crises is observed with accelerated financial 
globalization. Consequently, there is a strong correlation between the raise in international 
capital movements and financial crises (Şimşek, 2004)34. 
 International capital movements can be categorized as direct and portfolio 
investment. The latter causes financial crises. This kind of capital movements,which are 
called hot money, has positive effects in the first place. However, in correlation with the 
fragility of the economy, it affects the economy negatively.. Considering the countries that 
were faced with financial crisis, raise in import and current account deficits are 
remarkable. The rate of current account deficit in national income passes 4 % and this is 
defined as a risk for such countries. This rate is up to 4 % in Turkey, Asia, and Mexico 
crises (Celasun, 2001)35. 
 Current account deficit is generally attempted to be financed by borrowing and by 
the raise in international reserves. This situation is also increases the probability of crises.  
                                                 
33  See for details: Meriç, Metin 'Borçlanmanın Konsolide Bütçe Kaynak Yapısı Üzerine Etkisi' 
(2003). 
34 See for details: Şimşek, M. 'Finansal Küreselleşmenin Ekonomik Krizler Üzerindeki Etkileri ve Örnek 
Kriz Ekonomileri' (2004).  
35  See for details: Celasun, Merih 'Gelişen Ekonomilerin Dış Kaynak Kullanımı, Finansal Krizler ve 
Türkiye Örneği' (2001). 
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 The impacts of arising factors of international capital inflow in developing 
countries are raising aggregate demand, pegging the exchange, affecting the policies, and 
affording opportunity for investors (Calvo,1994)36. 
 The common feature of the countries which experienced crisis is that they have 
more foreign capital inflows than their current account deficit. 
  
 4.3. Inflation 
  
 Inflation can be defined as a rise in the level of prices. Some of the economists 
believe that high rates of growth in the money supply causes high rates of inflation. A 
small amount of inflation is seemed as a benefit for the economy. Nevertheless,  high or 
unexpected inflation leads to discouragement in savings and investment, weakening trade 
balance,  and destroying the trust to government. 
 One of the vital concepts for economic stability is price stability. A healthy 
monetary policy depends on the stability of money as the principal condition. This 
highlights the importance of pegged monetary value (Şimşek, 2004)37. 
 Inflation may occur in countries which do not have a potent currency. Inflation 
might affect the basic variables of economy. In order to get inflation under control,  some 
instruments can be utilized. One of these instruments is going into debt. This instrument 
puts pressure on inflation and also pulls for growth in the short run. However, in the long 
run it may drift to a crisis, if not making a contribution in reel economy (Çağlar, 2003)38.  
 
                                                 
36  See for details: Calvo, Guillermo 'The Capital Inflows Problem: Concepts and Issues' with L. 
Leiderman and C. Reinhart (1994) 
37 See for details: Şimşek, M. 'Finansal Küreselleşmenin Ekonomik Krizler Üzerindeki Etkileri ve Örnek 
Kriz Ekonomileri' (2004).  
38  See for details: Çağlar, Ünal 'Döviz Kurları Uluslararası Para Sistemi ve Ekonomik İstikrar' (2003). 
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4.4. Exchange rate policy 
  
 The exchange rate specifies the worth of the currency among other currency. 
Depending on governments' policy the exchange rate could be free-floating or pegged. In a 
free-floating currency, the country's exchange rate floats against the others which is 
determined by the supply and demand of market forces. Adjustable peg system is a system 
of fixed exchange rate regimes with a provision for the devaluation of the currency. 
 There is a high correlation between the instability of exchange rate and the crises. 
Repressing its reel worth or fixing the exchange rate make the financial sector more 
fragile. The last resort of lender Central Bank is one of the mechanisms to avoid crises. 
Accomplishing the assigned task and fixing exchange rate increase the risk of currency by 
an initiative factor of increasing the open positions of banks. As a result of such  a policy, it 
triggered the relation of currency crisis and banking crisis (Duman, 2002)39. 
 The raise in interest rate, deterioration in bank balances, stock market crash, and 
growing ambiguity cause inverse selection and moral hazard problems which ultimately 
lead to currency crises and stricture in economic actions. Moreover, this stricture is 
accompanied with the banking crisis. Therefore, the economy basically finds itself in the 
circle.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39  See for details: Duman, Koray 'Finansal Krizler ve Bankacılık sektörünün yeniden Yapılandırılması' 
(2002). 
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 4.5. Financial Liberalization 
 
 
 
 Developing countries embrace the free market economy to be consistent with 
democratic process. Financial liberalization  is a result of deregulation which implies 
abrogating supervision and restrictions on banking system in a significant degree. Also, it 
is denoted as a process to step the international capital movements.  
 There is a plethora of definitions on financial liberalization, but the most 
explanatory account is as follows: 
 
 “Developing countries performed many reforms to liberalize their fiscal systems. 
The most important ones of those reforms are removal of credit ceiling by liberalization of 
interest rates, diminishing the banks' required reserve ratio in Central Bank, opening the 
banking sector to both foreign and domestic investors, and liberalization of capital 
movements” (Güloğlu, and Attunoğlu, 2002)40. 
 The common economic opinion in 1980s was Neo-classical theory which was 
supported by financial liberalization. In this context, foreign savings become important 
sources for domestic investments and economic growth when domestic savings are 
inadequate. By means of liberalization of capital movements, savings are flowed to the 
countries which are in capital squeeze (Khoury, 1992)41.  
 The fragility of the banking sector increases by financial liberalization. Removal of 
credit ceiling and the raise in volatility of interest rates face banks with serious risk of 
interest. Banking sector is likely to  encounter two types of risks. The first issue is currency 
crisis. This kind of risk exposes incapacity paying of banks which are open to crisis. The 
                                                 
40  See for details: Güloğlu, Bülent; Altunoğlu A. Ender 'Finansal Serbestleşme Politikaları ve Finansal 
Krizler: Latin Amerika, Meksika, Asya ve Türkiye Krizleri' (2002) 
41  See for details: Khoury, Sarkis J. 'Recent Developments in International Banking and Finance' 
(1992) 
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second issue is the credit risk. If  overdue credits are rocketed and Central Bank can not 
fulfill the function of last resort lending, then bankruptcies are inevitable. Moreover, if 
bankruptcies materialize, narrowing of money supply occurs and crisis becomes deeper 
(Duman, 2004)42.  
  
 The rise in capital movements leads to a rise in credit amounts. If the rise in the 
credit amounts is more than the rise in money supply, the currency reserves of Central 
Bank melt equally (Flood, 1992)43. Such a situation refers to a speculative attack as seen in 
table 1 (Wypolsz, 2001)44. 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 See for details: Duman, Koray 'Finansal Krizlere Karşı Politika Tercileri' (2004). 
43  See for details: J. Bhandari og R. Flood; Agénor, P. 1992, ”Speculative attacks and models of 
balance of 
 payments crisis” (1992). 
44  See for details: Wyplosz, Charles 'How Risky is Financial Liberalization in the Developing 
Countries?' (2001). 
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      Table 1. Financial Liberalization and Crises 
Country Financial Liberalization Crisis 
Argentina 1977 03/1980-05/1989-12/1994- 
12/2001 
Bovilya 1985 10/1987 
Brazil 1975 11/1985-07/1994 
Chile 1980 09/1981 
Colombia 1980 07/1982 
Mexico 1989 09/1982-09/1992-09/1994 
Paraguay 1990 1995 
Uruguay 1976 03/1981 
Venezuela 1976 10/1983 
Indonesia 1989 1992 
South Korea 1983 09/1997 
Malaysia 1991 07/1985-09/1997 
Thailand 1989 03/1979-10/1993-09/1997 
Philippines 1981 01/1981 
Israel 1990 1985 
Jordan 1988 08/1989 
Kenya 1991 1993 
Tanzania 1993 1988 
Turkey 1987 03/1994-02/2001 
Egypt 1991 --- 
Zambia 1992 01/1995 
Guatemala 1989 --- 
Peru 1980 04/1989 
El Salvador 1991 1989 
       Source: C. Wyplosz (2001) How risky is Financial Liberalization in the Developing Countries?,     
        Discussion Paper Series UN, p.26   
 
 As seen in table above,  many countries adopt financial liberalization policy 
between the years of 1980 and 1990. Unfortunately, most of the countries failed and 
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experienced crises except a few of them. The main problem of this failure is the rise in 
foreign trade, short term debt, and current account deficits in view of Central Bank 
reserves. Financial liberalization facilitates international trade, but contagion effect occurs 
and financial crises are easily debouched. 
 
 4.5.1. Turkey Case 
 
 Before 1930s exchange rate floating was experienced, caused by the non-existence 
of exchange arrangement. But, in 20th of February 1930, exchange control regime was 
embraced, by means of the acceptance of maintaining pecuniary law. After 1946 through 
the acceptance of multiparty system, parliament asserted enhancing private sector and 
benefiting from foreign capital. In 1950, “Democrat Party” came into play and put some 
efforts for liberalization. At the end of 1970s Turkey slipped into depression, and that 
showed the importance of restructuring the accumulation of capital. High rate of inflation 
and foreign exchange squeeze were the main indicators of depression.  
 Until 1980s, there was a rigid foreign exchange rate regime in scenario, that is 
called in the proper sense  fixed exchange rate regime. Simply put, in 1980 , determination 
of exchange rate authority was taken from Cabinet Council and given to Finance Ministry 
which alienated the Central Bank in 1981.   Until that year, Central Bank embarked to set 
and make public exchange rate daily.  
 Real progress in financial liberalization began in 1980s with “January 24th 
Decisions”. By the way, it was adopted  more flexible exchange rate policy. Around the 
policy, exchange rate was devalued approximately 50%.   The principal issues of “January 
24 Decisions” were 
 27 
 
•  minimization of government intervention in the economy 
•  formation of a free market economy 
•  integration of domestic economy into world economy 
•  encouraging foreign capital  
 Generally with these decisions government formed some reforms which were 
removal of price controls, private sector expansion, incitement of private savings and 
investments, freeing foreign trade, tax system improvement, minimizing the controls over 
money transfers and encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 As seen in table 2 exports, imports and FDI increased significantly. These are 
mostly caused by “The Foreign Capital Framework Decree” in 1980 and other two decrees 
in 1983 and 1984 to loosen up constraints on FDI. In 1985 and 1986 the formation of free 
trade zones, removal of restrictions on foreign equity participation and discontinuation of 
minimum export requirements were more fundamental FDI-related measures (Koch and 
Chaudhary, 2001)45.  
 
Table 2. Imports, Exports, and Net FDI into Turkey, 1970–1990 
          (Million Dollars) 
 
 1970 1973 1976 1978 1980 1981 1983 1985 1988 1990 
Exports  588 1,317    1,960    2,288  2,910  4,703  5,905   8,255 11,929  13,026
Imports 948 2,086 4,872 4,369 7,513 8,567 8,895 11,230 13,706 22,581
FDI 58* - - - 18 141 87 158 387 788 
Source: State Planning Organisation, Undersecretariate of Treasury. 
             * Total capital flow, both inflow and outflow. 
 
 
  
                                                 
45 See for details: Koch, Levent and Chaudhary M.A. 'February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and 
Consequences' (2001). 
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Graph 1. Imports, Exports, and Net FDI into Turkey, 1970-1990 
  
 
 Besides, the government also eliminated the interest ceilings on loans and deposits 
in 1980,  phased out direct credits in 1988, and liberalized capital flow in 1990 (Mehrez 
and Kaufmann, 1999)46. Accordingly, Turkish Lira became a convertible currency.  
Moreover, government established “Istanbul Stock Exchange” in 1986 and “Istanbul Gold 
Exchange” in 1994 to liberalize the financial sector more. In addition, in 1984 government 
allowed to open foreign currency accounts and in 1986 allowed banks to have interbank 
borrowing for overnight facilities (Denizer, 2000)47. 
 Unfortunately, concomitant reforms did not accompany economy liberalization and 
democratization in 1980s, as the country got into foreign debt more and more which 
caused balance of payments deficiencies and increased deficit financing. Some failures 
were: 
•     not presenting the reforms to invigorate public finance 
•     not acquainting the reforms to evolve substructure meeting the open     
                                                 
46 See for details: Mehrez, Gil; Kaufmann Daniel 'Transparency, Liberalization and Financial Crises' (1999). 
47 See for details: Denizer, Cevdet 'Foreign Entry in Turkey's Banking Sector 1980-1997' (2000). 
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market requirements 
•     not enforcing legal and structural reforms to prevent corruption 
•      not implementing reforms to improve governance, transparency, and 
accountability 
 As a sum, the economy struggled with large-scale squandering of resources 
overtime. Also the resources were the solutions to November 2000 and February 2001 
crises (Koch, and Chaudhary, 2001)48. 
  As mentioned before, developing countries have to put balance in money market, 
and cover foreign trade deficit not to suffer from financial liberalization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 See for details: Koch, Levent and Chaudhary M.A. 'February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and 
Consequences' (2001). 
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 5. The Analysis of the factors of February 2001 Crisis in Turkey 
 
 5.1. The effects of Asia and Russia Crises  
 Due to the globalization, international capital movements triggers financial crises  
at all markets all over the world. With the accelerated financial globalization, the number 
of crises are increased. Hence, a strong correlation is seen between the raise in 
international capital movements and the financial crises (Şimşek, 2004)49.  
The global crisis first started in Japan. It spreaded  to Asia, then Russia and finally 
it broke out in Brazil as contagion effect. Here, we will only mention the effects of Russia 
and Asia crises which mostly affected Turkish economy.  
 The Jusen crisis in Japan partially leaped upon Asia. That's why foreign investors 
took back their savings and investments and also this caused the stock market to collapse. 
The evaluation after crisis showed the lack of adequate financial sector control, lack of 
early signaling system, and lack of transparency of the system. The decay in foreign 
balance breeds the increase in current account and trade deficits date from 1995.  
 Different from Asia, the main reason that took Russia into crisis was IMF which 
suspended its support caused by scantiness of resources. When IMF pointed out the issue, 
the crisis exploded since each investor works with Russia, by means of the IMF support on 
it. As a result, everyone who was in notice called up account.  
 Russia crisis came into play at the end of August in 1998. In Turkey, the crisis 
engendered the loss of feel-good factor, upswing in limbo and rise in interest rates. 
                                                 
49 See for details: Şimşek, M. 'Finansal Küreselleşmenin Ekonomik Krizler Üzerindeki Etkileri ve Örnek 
Kriz Ekonomileri' (2004).  
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Luckily, Turkey faced the global crisis with relatively minimum current account deficit and 
potent reserves. Until July 1997, Turkey submitted fiscal policies to discipline, and from 
the beginning of 1998 Turkey worked towords decreasing inflation and keep it from worse 
effects of global crisis. In 1998 the government's monetary policy on declining inflation 
and the application of domestic debt program decremented market fluctuations and limbo. 
The treaty “Staff-Monitoring” with IMF also strengthened the feel-good  factor in money 
markets. 
 Besides, in the second quarter of the year economic stagnation showed itself in 
macroeconomic data. In the first quarter economic growth was 9 %, however in second 
quarter it came down to 4 %. To aim at net domestic assets, monetary policy tumbled  on 
the ground of crisis. Istanbul Stock Exchange experienced a decline because of backout of 
foreign funds and rise in interest rates. Unfortunately, the government had to take up 1998 
inflation targeting. In experienced condition interest rate got in rise while at the first 
quarter of 1998 it was losing ground with feel-good  factor (Alidedeoğlu, 1998)50.  
 To sum up, the indirect and after effects were experienced by Turkey after Asia and 
Russia crises. The crisis occurred in emerging markets at a regional level. Some time later, 
it showed itself all in emerging markets. Thus, the investors called in savings and 
investments. At this stage, it got harder to borrow funds from international capital market 
which was grappling with the balance of payments problem. Turkey entered the year 2000 
with such issues, in other words with the virus of crisis (ekodialog.com).   
 
 
 
                                                 
50 See for details: Alidedeoğlu, Eda (1998) 
http://www.tusiad.org/konj_int.nsf/50f2d2e00f9ee88bc225669e002a9f11/4ee97bf2d8ba0b59c22566c8002
e2ccc?OpenDocument 
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 5.2. Fragility of the Banking Sector  
 
  
 As stated above in the part  of financial liberalization; it effects the increase of the 
fragility of banking sector. Credit ceiling removal and volatility of interest rates increment 
face banks with crucial risks of interest. Here, two issues are triggering; the first one is 
currency crisis and the second one is the credit risk (Duman, 2004)51.  
 
 One of the most triggering factors of  February 2001 crisis in Turkey is banking 
sector vulnerability. To eliminate the impacts of 1994 crisis, the government brought 
deposit security for banking system. Meanwhile banks oppressed to market forces, 
whereupon many banks co-opt into Saving Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF). It is assumed 
that, like in Asia crisis, the number of sunken banks is too high which also brings 
breakdown of trust. 
 Before the crisis, banking sector conveyed some risks, such as liquidity risk, open 
positions of banks, the effects of public banks, and weakness of regulations. 
Liquidity risk: Deficiency in liquidity means disability in corresponding to a sudden and 
big amount of deposits or to countervail those deposits from interbank market with high 
cost (Yıldırım, 2002)52. In general, banks give their short term deposits as long term 
liability in order to reap big gains. To avoid liquidity risk, banks should withhold more 
funds. However, this policy also brings about lower dimes of banks. To sum, to obtain big 
gains banks should confront liquidity risk.  
                                                 
51 See for details: Duman, Koray 'Finansal Krizlere Karşı Politika Tercileri' (2004). 
52 See for details: Yıldırım, Oğuz 'Türk Bankacılık Sectöründe Yaşanan Finansal Krizler (1980-2002): 
Nedenleri, Sonuçları ve Ekonomik Etkileri' (2002). 
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 Because of central bank's foreign exchange reserves are confronted with the  liquid 
liabilities of the banking sector, CB finds itself as the lender of the last resort of banks 
during a crisis period. To assess the case for Turkey, total liquid liabilities of banking sector 
are shown in table 3. To understand the table, the definitions are as follows ; M1YSR 
stands for the total of M1, repos, foreign currency demand deposits, domestic and foreign 
currency saving deposits with maturity one month or less; M2YR is stands for the total of 
M2, foreign currency deposits and repos, the total reserves includes both central bank's and 
commercial banks' reserves. 
 
Table 3. Banking Sector Short-term Liabilities and Credit Stock 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
M1YSR/CB reserves 1.85 1.76 1.81 1.75 1.49 2.22 1.78 
M1YRS/Total reserves 1.04 1.21 1.28 1.21 1.05 1.46 1.04 
M2YR/CB reserves 3.57 3.48 3.39 3.64 3.53 4.16 3.98 
M2YR/Total reserves 2.01 2.39 2.40 2.52 2.47 2.73 2.32 
Credit/GNP (%) 20.4 23.9 26.2 20.8 20.7 21.1 18.2 
Real credit growth (%) 18.6 24.6 7.7 -14.7 -13.6 17.4 -28.2 
Consumer Credit/Total credit (%) 3.7 4.4 5.6 6.3 6.2 17.4 7.1 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
 
 
 
 In brief, the first four indicators show the ratio of total liquid liabilities of the sector 
to foreign exchange reserves. The most attractive concept is the stabilization of the 
liquidity ratios in years if taken the average for each row; that are 1.81, 1.18, 3.68, 2.16, 
2.4, and 6.36 respectively. For the year 2001 it is observed that the value in the time period 
remained under the average for all, the sharp decline is in the real credit growth. The rapid 
credit growth is seen as a signal of increasing credit risk for the banks. The credit growth is 
low in 2001 but in 2000 it is very high. However, it is possible to say that the ratios are not 
 34 
 
different from the non crisis years.  
 As a result, because of the high ratio of interest rates, high amounts of deposits 
threw on the market. Therefore, the banking system became more sensitive to the liquidity 
risk before the crisis period. 
 
Open Positions of Banks: Monetary unit mismatch that occurs between a bank's assets and 
liability is called open position of banks. Such open positions may be included by domestic 
or foreign currency. If the assets which are in foreign exchange can not cover the liability 
in the same type, as such, open positions occur with the foreign currency type. In the case 
of devaluation such banks with open positions, may get into the positions as could not able 
to fulfill the foreign liabilities (Eğilmez, 2002)53. In 1985 Turkey commenced the open 
positions application dependent to exchange risk. During the years of 2000-2002 by 
Inflation Contention Program, foreign loans were raised by the banks. Some banks such as 
Demirbank and Toprakbank, turn these loans into domestic currency and take DGB 
(Domestic Government Bonds). The main aim of taking DGB is increasing the rate of 
profit through making use of interest rate difference. At the end of 2000, to cover the open 
positions banks have to take foreign currency with high amount of rate of interest. In 
November, 2000, it is also seen below that the open positions of banks are raised. That is, 
the rise in the banks' interest risk, one of the most triggering factors of the 2000 and so on 
2001 crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53  See for details: Eğilmez, Mahfi  'Ekonomi Politikası Sözlüğü' (2002) 
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Table 4. Net Foreign Exchange Positions of the Banks  
          (Million Dollars) 
 
 2000a 2000b 2000c Change (%) 
Assets  
 
54115 59484  63122 16.6 
Liabilities 
 
68482 81019  81111 18.5 
Net Position 
(SDIF included) 
-14367  -21535 -17989 25.2 
Net Position 
(SDIF excluded) 
-8553 -15780 -13675 60.0 
Source: BDDK, 2001a:42 
a. Values for end of January 2000 
b. Values for end of November 2000 
c. Values for end of December 2000 
 
 
 
Graph 2. Net Foreign Exchange Position of the Banks (2000) 
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State and Private Banks: State banks had approximately a ratio of 45% of total assets in the 
banking sector during 1990s. The ratio recedes to 34.2% in December 2000. However, if 
the portion of SDIF is included, it becomes 42.7%. State banks gather 39.9% of total 
deposits and materialize 25.7% of total credits in the year 2000. In total assets side, 
commercial banks have the lot 46.2%, foreign banks have 6.6%, development and 
investment banks have 4.4%. It is obviously seen here that, the market is mostly controlled 
by state banks. State banks primary target is not increasing the profit, and the huge market 
lot brought political benefits, and also caused 25 billion dollar duty losses.   
 
Table 5. Assets Allocation Between Banks in December 2000 (%) 
 
 
 Assets Deposits Loans 
State Banks 34.2 39.9 27.5 
Private Banks 46.2 44.2 55.9 
Foreign Banks 6.6 2.5 3.5 
SDIF Banks 8.5 13.4 6.7 
source: BDDK, 2001a:27 
 
  
  
 Moreover, there exists an increasing size of duty loss accumulation for state banks 
and a necessity to credit duty loss by short term liabilities. The time after 1992, 
government debt instruments (GDI) had grown, and financial needs of Treasury had been 
increased. Such issues cause government to finance its necessities and some activities from 
state banks' loans. Unfortunately, neither the principal  nor the interest repaid, and the 
Treasury led to treat those nonperforming loans as performing loans by state banks. At that 
time, Treasury was not only the director of those banks but also the banking supervision 
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authority. This feature was one of the most critical factors that caused  the duty lost 
accumulation(Özatay, Sak, 2002)54.  The increasing indicators are given below 
 
Table 6. Selected indicators, 1995-2001 (percent of GNP) 
 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR)  5.0 8.6 7.7 9.4 15.6 12.5 15.9 
Duty losses of state banks     2.2 4.2 5.2 7.5 13.3 12.0 0.0 
Duty losses of state banks + PSBR 7.2 12.8 12.9 16.9 28.9 24.5 15.9 
Source: Treasury 
 
Graph 3. Selected Indicators 1995-2001 (percent of GNP) 
 
 
 If the ratio of lira to foreign exchange liabilities is analyzed, it indicates a major 
discrepancy between state and private banks. The rate was higher for private banks and 
much lower for state banks also with a declining slope.  
                                                 
54  See for details: Özatay, Fatih; Sak, Güven 'The 2000-2001 financial crisis in Turkey' (2002). 
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Table 7.  Ratio of FX / lira deposits, 1997-2001 
 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000a 2000b 2000c 2000d 2000e 2000f
Private  212.20    201.63   274.65 285.07 279.99 299.90 209.24 205.37 237.54 
State 46.37 35.61 26.49 31.66 32.42 33.13 29.37 37.12 37.12 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
a. Values for end of March 2000 
b. Values for end of June 2000 
c. Values for end of September 2000 
d. Values for end of December 2000 
e. Values for end of March 2001 
f. Values for end of June 2001 
 
  
 Hence, private banks were more open to exchange rate risk and state banks 
were open to interest rate risk in those years. Therefore, state banks were affected 
most in November 2000 crisis, and its effects reflected on the private banking system 
as a currency collapse (Özatay, Sak, 2002)55.  
 
 5.2.1. Media-Bank 
 
 
  
 In developed countries a bank cannot own the media and affiliated companies. with 
regard to the ownership of media and banks, there are tough restrictions. When Turkey 
case is analyzed, in contrast to the restrictions, the situation is impolitic. More than 10% 
                                                 
55  See for details: Özatay, Fatih; Sak, Güven 'The 2000-2001 financial crisis in Turkey' (2002). 
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share in a TV or a radio station, are owned by companies (Koch, Chaudhary, 2001)56.  
 The table below shows how Turkish system is working. It is always emphasized 
that “latitude of media” is the main concept, but in such condition it is not able to 
distinguish media from banks and also from the government. An interesting triangle 
between media, banks and companies is stated  in 2000 as seen below.  
 
Table 8: Holding Companies Owing Media and Banks, 2000 
 
Holding Company Media Bank  
Rumeli Holding Star Newspaper and TV Imar Bank  
Adabank 
Ihlas Holding Türkiye Newspaper and TV
  
Ihlas Finance 
Medi Group Sabah Newspaper and ATV Etibank 
Doğan Holding Milliyet, Hürriyet Posta, 
Radikal Newspaper and 
Channel D, CNN-Türk 
Dışbank 
Doğuş Holding NTV and Channel E Garanti Bank 
Osmanlı Bank 
Körfez Bank 
 
Çukurova Holding 
Akşam Newspaper, Show 
TV and Channel 6 
Yapı Kredi Bank 
Pamukbank 
Bayındır Holding BRT Bayındırbank 
Zeytinoğlu Holding Es TV Esbank 
Nergis Holding Olay TV and Newspaper Interbank 
Source: Gönültaş, Nuh, Zaman Newspaper, October 31, 2000 
   Doğru Necati, Zaman Newspaper, November 1, 2000 
              The Economist, April 7, 2001 
 
 This view is a crucial factor which increased the Turkey's financial sector 
instability. The connection between media-banks and companies has deeply affected the 
economic corruption of the country. For instance, the power of Doğan Group on economy 
                                                 
56 See for details: Koch, Levent and Chaudhary M.A. 'February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and 
Consequences' (2001). 
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can be seen in the table above. In addition to having 50 percent of the media, together with 
“İş Bank” they purchased 51 percent of the biggest oil distributor “Petrol Ofisi” in 2000 
(Koch, Chaudbary, 2001)57. Then by, it is obviously seen how much media stands in the 
economy, which is caused financial instability as mentioned.  
 As Gönültaş; Demirgüç and Detragiache (1997)58 came to an agreement on a reason 
of banking crisis as in the countries with liberalized banking sector. However, with weak 
supervision and easy to circumvent legal remedies against fraud may cause banking crisis 
with looting, and bank managers may find out failures in projects but pass out to divert 
money for personal use.  
So the financial liberalization factor can be seen as one of the indicators of 2001 
crisis. The fragility and instability in the finance sector of a country apparently lead to an 
economic crisis as experienced in 2001. For a healthy and liberalized economy, one of the 
main circumstances is disconnection of media and bank sector 
. 
5.3. Debt Stock and Political Instability 
 
 
 The public debt factor can be analyzed as follows within the political instability: 
 Debt sometimes is an economic policy tool, or a need. But if, reckoning capacity of 
a country  surmount the definite level of GNP, it turns out to be a debt crisis, or we can say 
that it would be an accelerative force to breed a financial crisis. Increases in government 
expenditures and the effect of consequent budget deficits on the economy have powerful 
impact on crises. Public finance worsening accelerated in the 1990 as a  result of the 
                                                 
57 See for details: Koch, Levent and Chaudhary M.A. 'February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and 
Consequences' (2001). 
58 See for details: Demirguc, Aslı; Detragiache Enrica 'The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence from 
Developed and Developing Countries' (1997). 
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structural problems of the Turkish economy and reached peak level in 2001 when the 
financial crisis occurred. In Turkey, borrowing is the main source in public financing. 
Below table shows the public revenue, public expenses, and budget deficit. It is seen that  
the ratio of budget deficit over GNP is getting higher over years.  The ratio in 1990 is 3.3% 
and in 2001 about 15%.   
 
Table 9. Public Finance Balance (Trilyon TL) 
Years Public Revenue Rise % PPI % Public Expenses Rise % Deficit Deficit/GN
P (%) 
 
1990 55,2 76 52,3  68,5 76 -13,3 (3,3) 
1991 96,7 75 55,3  130,3 90 -33,5 (3,3) 
1992 174,2 80 62,1  221,7 70 -47,4 (5,3) 
1993 351,4 102 58,4  485,2 119 -133,9 (4,3) 
1994 745,1 112 120,7  897,3 85 -152,2 (6,7) 
1995 1.394,0 87 86,0  1.710,6 91 -316,6 (3,9) 
1996 2.702,0 94 75,9  3.940,2 130 -1.238,1 (4,0) 
1997 5.750,1 113 85,4  7.990,7 103 -2.240,7 (8,3) 
1998 11.887,6 107 64,0  15.585,4 95 -3.697,8 (7,6) 
1999 18.973,3 60 52,2  28.017,8 80 -9.044,5 (6,9) 
2000 33.756,0 78 51,4  46.602,0 66 -12.846,0 (11,6) 
2001 51.813,0 53 88.6 80.379,0 72 -28.566,0 (15.9) 
2002 76.400,0 47 30.8 115.485,0 44 -39.085,0 (13.8) 
  Source: Mahfi Egilmez, www.mahfiegilmez.nom.tr 
 The rapid increase in the overall debt of the country is the main factor assisting in 
crises. In a short period, the total debt increased from $115 billion in 1997 to $171 billion 
in 2000 (Eğilmez, The Radikal, April 24,2001). Some of the debts of Turkish Treasury 
were to the government entity, state banks and Central Bank. That debts interests were not 
market rates, but kind of an indexation (Kumcu, Ercan, The Hurriyet, May 28, 2005).  
 Income redistribution policies have increased the deficits and public sector bonds 
have been used in financing these deficits after 1990s. This has been the main reason that 
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short-term speculative capital enters Turkey since the treasury borrowing's was based on 
high interest rates. Beyond that, appreciation of Turkish Lira policies pursued by 
governments  has been supportive to these policies. Namely, high interest rates and 
appreciation of local currency has been a principal reason in rushing of short-term capital 
movements into Turkey (Bıldırıcı, Sunal, Bakırtaş, 2004)59. 
 Internal debt of Turkey gets in a swift increase from 15.4 % of GNP in 1991 with 
zero duty losses, to 46 % in 1999 with 16.7% state banks' duty losses. Moreover, in the 
process of finance oriented policy, domestic debt stock has increased which is not 
functional and also has a crisis generating nature. In 1990, the ratio of domestic debt to 
GNP was 14.4%; it raised to 29% in 2000 and to 69% in 2001. Such an impetuous increase 
in debt was mainly caused by high primary deficit and borrowing at high interest rate. 
Particularly after 1994 high budget deficits had induced a harsh distress on domestic 
financial markets by forcing to rise real interest rate. Furthermore, inflation rate 
fluctuations also acted on high real interest rate in that period. As a result, the ratio of real 
interest rate to GDP averaged 32% between the years 1994-1999. Unfortunately, in the 
year 1990,  30.76% of the ratio over interest to tax revenue increased to 77.09% in 2000. It 
is with sadness that government got into debt vicious cycle to repay principal and interest 
(Koch, Chaudhary, 2001)60. 
 The other case is foreign debt interest which is mostly affected by political 
instability. Between the years 1990 and 2002, high political instability was in the screen. In 
that period, several elections occurred with many mini elections which brought many 
expenditures worsening the country's economic and budgetary discipline. In that years 10 
                                                 
59  See for details: Bakırtaş, Tahsin; Bıldırıcı, Melike and Sunal, Seçkin 'Debt Structure in 
Turkey' (2004). 
60 See for details: Koch, Levent and Chaudhary M.A. 'February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and 
Consequences' (2001). 
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governments altered and also characterized by coalition governments coming in one 
another.  Political instability is mostly occurred in coalition governments and leads to 
replacement of tax revenues by seignorage revenues,that tax structure is out of effective 
construction. Many of the governments discontinue the old development projects and 
interrupts the economic stabilization programmes with starting the new ones as their own 
work, naturally bringing about budget deficits, seignorage, ans domestic debt. In 
conclusion, the political instability of country led to a rise in both domestic and foreign 
debt. 
 The prevalent opinion on the February 2001 crisis in Turkey was bunched on 
currency crisis. In that date there existed an attack on currency, but the main reason 
breeding crisis was the high ratio of public debt and its structure (Erçel Gazi, “2001 Krizi 
Borç Kriziydi”, The Vatan, February 20, 2006).  
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Table 10. Selected Indicators of Turkey’s Economy, 1990–2001 
 
Year Domestic 
Debt/GNP 
(%) 
Foreign 
Debt/GNP 
(%) 
Public 
Sector 
Debt/GNP 
(%) 
Duty 
Losess/
GNP 
(%) 
Primary 
Deficit/GNP 
(%) 
Interest/Tax 
Revenue 
(%) 
GNP 
Growth 
(%) 
Real 
Interest 
Rates (%)
1990 14.4 32.2 28.7 0.0 -3.6 30.76 9.4 -- 
1991 15.4 33.2 35.1 0.0 -6.2 30.61 0.3 -- 
1992 17.6 34.7 35.8 0.0 -7.0 28.46 6.4 13.27 
1993 17.9 37.0 35.1 0.7 -5.6 44.07 8.1 11.21 
1994 20.6 50.1 45.1 1.9 -0.2 50.75 -6.1 79.17 
1995 17.3 43.1 41.3 2.2 2.7 53.13 -0.3 29.71 
1996 21.0 42.9 46.4 4.2 -12 66.73 0.6 37.64 
1997 21.4 43.3 42.9 5.2 -2.1 48.00 8.5 18.29 
1998 21.9 46.8 43.7 7.5 0.5 66.90 3.9 30.57 
1999 29.3 54.9 61.4 13.3 -1.9 72.40 -6.1 32.71 
2000 29.0 59.0 60.8 12.0 2.9 77.09 6.1 14.04 
2001 69.2 79.0 78.1E 0.0   -8.5  
Source: Domestic Debt/GNP, Undersecretariate of Treasury; Foreign Debt/GNP, Central Bank and Undersecretariate of Treasury; Duty 
Losses/GNP, Public Sector Debt/GNP, Primary Deficit/GNP, Interest/Tax Revenue, GNP Growth, Real Interest Rates: New Economic 
programme 
  
 
 
 5.3.1. Government Expenditures 
  
 Stated government and public expenditures are another important topic which take 
role in debt stock. Each government comes into scene with increasing expenditures, new 
taxes. Unqualified public expenditures also increase the need of additional borrowing. 
Governments have wasted financial resources for needless manners or with huge amount. 
The table below shows the increases in selected government expenditures in single year 
2000, which tells of the ugly picture silently. According to Turkish Court of Accounts, 
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government spent without accounting to the Parliament $16 billion from an unknown 
source out of the budget in 2000. This amount was spent by the government on its own 
without recording it and was raised as internal debt, is one opinion (Koch, Chaudhary, 
2001)61. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Increases in Selected Government Expenditures in 2000 
 
 
Expenditure Increase (%)
Communication 99
Transportation 98
Rents 58
Celebrations, Fairs, Promotions, etc. 67
Office Machine Purchases  110
Office Supplies 107
 Vehicle Purchases 85
NATO Expenses 151
Nationalization and Building Purchases 84
Transfer Payments 76
Source:Kadir Dikbaş, The Zaman, March 20, 2001 
 
 
 On another point of view, such wasteful usage of financial sources emanates from 
the government intervention in the economy. As seen, involvement of government in the 
economy is mounting up rather than reducing. TOBB (2001) announced that between the 
years 1990 and 2000 the waste of total public sector was amounted to $195.2 billion. 
  
  
 
                                                 
61 See for details: Koch, Levent and Chaudhary M.A. 'February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and 
Consequences' (2001). 
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5.4. November 2000 and February 2001 Crises 
 
  
 Turkey's economic status was getting worse at the end of 1999. Economic growth  
 
was -6.1%  -unfortunately an economic contraction-, and annual wholesale price inflation 
reached 70%, budget deficit increased enormously and whilst average weighted cost of 
borrowing to Treasury was 106% per annum, the rate of domestic debt to GNP attained to 
29% and current account deficit met 1.36 billion dollar -nearly the 0.7% of GNP-  (Mahfi 
Eğilmez, 2001)62. That was a brief summary of financial and economic conditions Turkey 
was passing through.  
 
 On 9th of December 1999 Turkey brought into force a new stabilization program 
with the support of  IMF (International Monetary Fund). The main objectives of the 
program were putting an end to public debt, and accelerating the economic growth. In 
December 1999, Turkey sent a letter of intent to IMF.  In that letter, reducing inflation 
program basically includes three concepts. 
•    to achieve non interest surplus in the budget 
•    to determine rate of exchange and monetary policy 
•    to implement structural reforms such as social security, taxation, agriculture and 
particularly privatization 
 The main cause of inflation is consented as public deficit and measures are taken to 
cover deficiency. For this purpose, solutions were to be formulated  to cut the public 
expenditures and increase the tax revenues. Moreover, to decrease the domestic debt, loans 
were taken from IMF and World Bank. Thus, the financing gap would be met by higher tax 
revenues and additional external borrowing.  
                                                 
62 See for details: Eğilmez, Mahfi 'On Turkish Crises' (2001). 
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 For the second step of the program, exchange rate was decided as nominal peg and 
the basket (1 Dollar + 0.77 Euro) would be risen as the expected inflation rate was (20% 
PPI). The change in exchange rate was planned as to determine with the activity in 
crosswise exchange rate and fixed it for a month. After the June 2001 it would be set as 
floating peg with gradation. 
 The monetary policy of the program was limiting the net domestic assets of the 
Central Bank. The ceiling was set as 1.2 quadrillion TL and the augmentation would be 
materialized with the currency inflows of net domestic assets under the IMF stand-by 
arrangement. Thus, CB would provide supplementary liquidity only with foreign exchange 
inflows. So, CB became as a currency board with a border for minting. Reducing domestic 
debt, and issuing TL -that are dependent on foreign exchange inflows- are the means to 
increase the liquidity and decrease the interest rate. 
 The last step of the program was structural reforms. In the year 2000, the planned 
privatization was 7.6  billion dollar (5 billion dollar was from TELEKOM), and in 2001 
this number would be 6 billion dollar. Unfortunately, because of some political reasons and 
deficiency in foreign demand the expected big privatizations -such as THY, TELEKOM- 
were not realized. Also, the expected reforms in agriculture and social security were not 
applied.  
 The IMF supported program showed itself firstly by a decline in interest rates. At 
the end of 1999, the cost of borrowing to the Treasury was 106% per annum, but after the 
program announced, it became 37% per annum by January 2000. The main cause of the 
decline is the rise in the foreign debt with low interest rates. Another positive sign of the 
program was the average overnight interest rates, that became 35.9% in January 2000 from 
69.97% in December 1999. Whatever the reasons are, the rapid decline showed a hazard 
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for the anti-inflation struggle. The decline in the interest rates reduced the debt burden of 
Treasury but also damaged the anti-inflation policy of CB (Eğilmez, 2001)63. 
 Turkey faced with a financial crisis on 22th of November 2000. At that date, 
overnight interest rate in interbank rised to 110.8%, and highest ratio was 210%. Compared 
with preceding periods, the interest rates were getting higher from the date,13th of 
November. Half of the months the interests rates in August, September, and October 
respectively were; 37.3%, 44.5%, 38.5%, and 81.45% in November. This leap may be seen 
as one of the signs of the crisis. (Uygur, 2001)64. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 See for details: Eğilmez, Mahfi 'On Turkish Crises' (2001). 
64 See for details: Uygur, Ercan  'Krizden Krize Türkiye: 2000 Kasım ve 2001 Şubat Krizleri' (2001). 
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Table 12.  Overnight interest rates in Interbank Market (%) 
 
 
 Lowest Highest Average St. Deviation
10/1999 65.51 69.95 69.47 1.08 
11/1999 68.72 69.99 69.78 0.30 
12/1999 69.86 70.00 69.97 0.04 
01/2000 18.90 64.56 35.90 10.28 
02/2000 26.28 83.19 49.23 14.12 
03/2000 26.38 68.07 39.08 8.95 
04/2000 18.90 45.87 36.16 6.62 
05/2000 32.08 56.34 41.29 6.55 
06/2000 26.35 75.75 42.00 11.67 
07/2000 13.60 38.83 25.97 5.08 
08/2000 22.14 92.57 35.57 16.90 
09/2000 23.71 79.65 46.20 14.05 
10/2000 25.82 71.22 38.41 9.72 
11/2000 27.94 315.92 79.46 67.61 
12/2000 61.75 873.13 198.95 238.97 
01/2001 31.12 76.84 42.16 12.47 
02/2001 36.55 4018.58 436.00 983.80 
03/2001 80.00 96.55 81.89 4.05 
Source:Central Bank of Turkey 
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Graph 4. Overnight Interest Rates in Interbank Market (%) 
 
 As seen in above table the increasing volatility in interest rates means a tightness 
and pressure on financial markets, which also brought the 22 November Crisis for Turkey 
(Uygur,2001)65. 
 
 5.4.1. Foreign Exchange Rate Policy: 
 
 After the explosion of the crisis, the reserves of Central Bank reduced dramatically. 
CB lost its reserves 3 billion dollar in 17-24 November week, and 2.5 billion dollar in 24th 
November- 1st December week. Then the total loss became 5.5 billion dollars in two 
weeks, in other words, gross foreign exchange reduced from 24.4 billion dollars to 18.9 
                                                 
65 See for details: Uygur, Ercan  'Krizden Krize Türkiye: 2000 Kasım ve 2001 Şubat Krizleri' (2001). 
 51 
 
billion dollars. 
 
Table 13.  Weekly Foreign Exchange Reserve of Central Bank 
               (Billion dollars)  
 
 
Date Gross Foreign Exchange Reserve
10/06/2000 24.530
10/13/2000 24.839
10/20/2000 24.239
10/27/2000 23.249
11/03/2000 24.256
11/10/2000 23.583
11/17/2000 24.433
11/24/2000 21.583
12/01/2000 18.942
12/08/2000 19.624
12/15/2000 19.823
12/22/2000 19.934
12/29/2000 19.635
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
 
Graph 5. Weekly Foreign Exchange Reserve of Central Bank  (2000) 
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Many of the economists agree on the type of the crisis as a liquidity crisis. But the base 
reason that underline the explosion of the crisis is confusing. The thoughts are;  
•    banks were not able to get into the new system as quick as it should be 
•    CB made a wrong identification on the crisis; thus, it was not able to prevent the 
crisis 
•    not CB but, IMF made a wrong identification 
 Indeed, the main factor of the crisis was the banking sector. The problems in 
financial sector were ignited by the banking sector. The increasing necessity of liquidity of 
the banks  with a high rate of interests caused the rise in foreign exchange demand. On the 
other hand, the foreign banks sold Treasury portfolios in a rush. Unfortunately, CB was not 
able to cover the liquidity necessity on time (Karaçor, 2006)66. 
 Some other reasons mentioned are  
   the pressure on small banks that were forced by larger banks 
•   the delay on suggested structural reforms, and especially in the delay of the 
privatization of  TELEKOM and THY 
•   arising a trust depression specially from foreign investors (it is said that a German 
and American bank drew more than 7 billion dollars) (Çarıkçı,200167; Kazgan,200168) 
 All suggested reasons firstly caused a deep trust depression of the 9th December 
1999 Economic Program, and spread to the markets, tighten the demands of reel sector, 
and also caused a speculative attack on foreign exchange. The rise in interest rates and the 
                                                 
66 See for details: Karaçor, Zeynep 'Öğrenen Ekonomi Türkiye: Kasım 2000- Şubat 2001 Krizinin 
Öğrettikleri' (2006). 
67 See for details: Çarıkçı, Emin '2000-2001 Yılı Ekonomik Krizlerin Sebepleri ve Sonuçları' (2001). 
68 See for details: Kazgan, Gülten 'Türkiye’de Ekonomik Krizler: (1929-2001) Nedenleri ve Sonuçları 
Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir İrdeleme' (2001). 
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loss in foreign exchange met by the support of IMF with 7.5 billion dollars and the transfer 
of some banks -which had high necessity of liquidity- to the SDIF. The remedies were seen 
adequate for the compensation of the crisis.  But, the markets were not as comfortable as it 
was seen. The evidence had appeared after three months in 19th February 2001. A dispute 
between president and prime minister triggered the speculative actions and occasioned a 
foreign exchange crisis (Karluk,2005)69. 
 On February 21st overnight interest rates in interbank market jumped up to 6200% 
and average of 4018.6%. The foreign exchange reserve of CB decreased to 22.58 on 
February 23rd from 27.94 on February 16th  and the loss was 5.36 billion dollars in a week. 
In November crisis only the foreign investors attacked on foreign exchange, but in 
February crisis not only the foreigners but also the domestic investors, mainly the banks, 
attacked on. CB compulsorily announced the floating regime on February 21st.  The market 
selling price of 1 dollar was 686500 on 19th, 920000 on 23rd and 960000 on 28th of 
February. By the way, the anti-inflation program come to end with two crisis. Because the 
crisis in the February was a foreign exchange crisis and more dangerous than a liquidity 
crisis (Uygur, 2001)70. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 See for details: Karluk, Rıdvan 'Cumhuriyetin İlanından Günümüze Türkiye Ekonomisinde Yapısal 
Dönüşüm' (2005). 
70 See for details: Uygur, Ercan  'Krizden Krize Türkiye: 2000 Kasım ve 2001 Şubat Krizleri' (2001). 
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Table 14. Weekly Foreign Exchange Reserve of Central Bank 
              (Billion dollars)  
 
 
Date Gross Foreign Exchange Reserve
01/05/2001 25.097
01/12/2001 26.593
01/19/2001 26.143
01/26/2001 25.691
02/02/2001 25.928
02/09/2001 26.565
02/16/2001 27.943
02/23/2001 22.581
03/02/2001 21.521
03/09/2001 21.529
03/16/2001 20.060
03/23/2001 19.170
03/30/2001 18.445
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
 
Graph 6. Weekly Foreign Exchange Reserve of Central Bank  (2001) 
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 The foreign currency crisis in February 2001 basically caused by the high rate of  
rise in current account deficit. The preparing factors of the crisis were  
•   the extreme rise in the value of TL 
•   the exceeding critic value of current account deficit 
•   the poverty of fiscal and banking sector  
•   duty loss values of public banks  
•   excessive rate of public expenditures 
•   the rise in the interest rate and profit risk of financial sector 
 The existing crises brought painful results 
•   economic contraction had been 8.5-9% 
•   national income diminished by 51 billion dollars 
•   19 banks closed 
•   1.5 billion people got unemployed 
•   the inflation jumped to 70% from 30% 
•   the payment of interests of Treasury increased 101% 
•   domestic debt stock was 4 times of the year 2000 (Karluk, 2005)71. 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 See for details: Karluk, Rıdvan 'Cumhuriyetin İlanından Günümüze Türkiye Ekonomisinde Yapısal 
Dönüşüm' (2005). 
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6. Transition Program for Strengthening the Turkish Economy 
 
 Not only the banking sector, but also corporate sector was severely affected by the 
February 2001 crisis. The depreciation of the exchange rate was a dangerous indicator of a 
new inflationary process. The politicians lost their credibility, there was a highly non-
trusted atmosphere. The undersecretary of the Treasury and the governor of the CB 
resigned. A sudden and obligatory transition to free floating exchange rate regime and high 
rate of devaluation, harmed the banking sector; especially the ones, which had open 
positions. The taken arrangements to prevent the collapse of banking system was forced by 
the fiscal system of the country. The capital account of balance of payments were deeply 
injured, and reel economy was narrowed (Celasun, 2002)72. To overcome the matters, the 
new IMF-supported program was announced in May 2001. The program included three 
pillars, 
•    fiscal and monetary discipline 
•    structural reforms 
 
•    external financial support  
 
 The main target of the program was the recapitalization of the banking sector. In 
that period, to not to uncontrol the inflation, the rise in public debt stock had been preferred 
with the auditing of monetary discipline. To strengthen the fiscal system of banking sector; 
•    Special arrangement DGB were given to public banks to purify the duty losses 
stocks from their balance sheets 
•    Special arrangement DGB and foreign currency deeds were given to the banks 
                                                 
72 See for details: Celasun, Merih '2001 Krizi, Öncesi ve Sonrası: Makroekonomik ve Mali Bir 
 Değerlendirme' (2002). 
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which were included to the SDIF 
•    Domestic debt barter was done with private banks (CB, 2002a: 
45-50; SPO, 2001 : 89-92). 
 
 Besides strengthening the fiscal policy of banking sector, to activate corporate 
profile of the sector and its supervision, some legal and operational arrangements are put 
into the scene. Public banks commission, depends on the given budget to the central 
government within the new legal arrangement procedure. This alternation in economy 
policy is so important to raise the politic function and transparency of the budget system 
(Celasun 2002)73. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 See for details: Celasun, Merih '2001 Krizi, Öncesi ve Sonrası: Makroekonomik ve Mali Bir 
 Değerlendirme' (2002). 
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Conclusion: 
 
 
 
 The February 2001 crisis is probably the severest crisis among the crises that 
Turkey has suffered. In this paper, the kinds of financial crises and the models of financial 
crises are scrutinized to analyze the cardinal factors of 2001 financial crisis of Turkey. The 
factors that are stated are as follows: the effects of Asian and Russian crises due to 
globalization and contagion effect; the fragility of banking sector that is mainly caused by 
financial liberalization; debt stock and political instability; and November 2000 crisis in 
Turkey. It is seen that the preceeding factors depict the 2001 crisis.  
 Moreover, the crisis which Turkey had experienced in 2001 was  a foreign currency 
crisis; and the main reason was  the high rate of  rise in current account deficit. The factors 
that lay the groundwork for the crisis are examined in this study. The factors are listed as  
the exceeding critic value of current account deficit, the extreme rise in the value of TL, 
the poverty of fiscal and banking sector, the rise in the interest rate and in the profit risk of 
financial sector, high duty loss values of public banks, and excessive rate of public 
expenditures.  
 Furthermore, the devastating results after the date 19th February 2001 came out , 
which affected not only the economic sector but also the social structure of the country. 
Subsequently, economic contraction became 8.5-9%,  national income diminished by 51 
billion dollars, the inflation jumped to 70% from 30%, the payment of interests of Treasury 
increased by 101%, domestic debt stock was 4 times more than that of 2000, 19 banks 
closed down, and 1.5 billion people went unemployed after the 2001 crisis. 
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 Consequently, all denoted reasons and results of the February 2001 crisis made 
Central Bank announce a new program, which is called “Transition Program for 
Strengthening the Turkish Economy”. The new economic program was established by IMF,  
and it mostly includes structural and legal reforms rather than economic measures. The 
main aim of the program was recapitalization of the banking sector. In this context, special 
arrangement DGB were given to public banks to purify the duty loss stocks  from their 
balance sheets. Moreover special arrangement DGB and foreign currency deeds were given 
to the banks  which were included to the SDIF. The curatory solutions of 2000 crisis was 
not successful by not conforming the assigned reforms. The importance of good 
governance and transparency, legal system, healthy banking sector, trust (etc.) evidently 
appeared after the February 2001 crisis.  
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